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INTRODUCTION
Chapter 11 is widely believed to be among the industrialized
world's most debtor-oriented reorganization laws. Critics assert that
Chapter 11 is too easily available and that it allows debtors too much
control by, inter alia, not requiring appointment of a trustee. One
criticism of Chapter 11, low returns to unsecured creditors, resonates
with an important theme of this Symposium, the Bebchuk-Fried pro-
posal to reduce secured creditor priority in insolvency proceedings.1
The Chapter 11 criticisms and the Bebchuk-Fried proposal raise the
question whether less easy access to Chapter 11, reduced debtor con-
trol, diminished secured creditor priority, or other changes could re-
duce filings and delays, improve performance, and reduce costs.
Directly exploring such issues without repealing or changing
Chapter 11 is not possible. Social experiments could help supply an
answer.2 Given political and practical reality, however, such experi-
ments are unlikely to be conducted. Second-best empirical evaluation
methods will have to suffice.
One method is to compare Chapter l's performance with that
of a reorganization system similar to Chapter 11, but differing in some
crucial respects, such as whether a trustee or other official must be
appointed. Comparing Chapter l's results with those of the second
system should yield insights into Chapter l's efficacy. This Article
presents the results of such an empirical study. It compares data from
prior Chapter 11 studies with new data on Finnish reorganizations.
Finnish reorganization law is in many important respects similar
to Chapter 11. But it contains two central features that are less
favorable to debtors. The first feature is its early detection and termi-
nation of cases inappropriate for reorganization. A de facto presump-
tion underlying Chapter 11 is that nearly all firms should be given a
chance to try to reorganize. Creditors wishing to terminate a case be-
1 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ. 857 (1996).
2 Imagine a Chapter 11-like system except that trustees were appointed randomly in
one-half of filings and were not required to be appointed in the other half of filings. Dif-
ferences in outcome could be attributed to the presence (or absence) of a trustee. For
discussion of such an experiment and its limitations, see THEODORE EISENBERG, CREATNG
AN EFFEcw SWEDISH RECONSTRUCTION LAw 63-64 (Studief6rbundet NS5ringsliv och
Samhilie (SNS), Occasional Paper No. 75, Dec. 1995) (published in Swedish as KONKURS
ELLER REKONSTRUKTION: HUR SKAPA EFFEKIVA LAGAR (SNS F6rlag 1995)). See generally
James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith, Assessing the Case for Social Experiments, 9 J. ECON.




cause they believe the debtor cannot successfully reorganize face a
considerable burden of proof. Finland and many other countries take
a different approach. 3 When a debtor files a reorganization petition,
creditors may immediately challenge the case's eligibility for reorgani-
zation.4 Most cases do not survive this initial screening.
A second noteworthy difference is the U.S. debtors' greater influ-
ence over the reorganization plan and the information communi-
cated to creditors. In the typical Finnish case, an appointed outside
official, called here an "administrator," oversees the case, provides
creditors with information, and proposes a reorganization plan. 5
Creditors nominate the administrator, who is thus likely to act in their
interest.6 In the United States, the debtor's management usually per-
forms the Finnish administrator's tasks. U.S. reorganizations are
therefore likely to be more debtor oriented than Finnish reorganiza-
tions. Chapter 1l's minimal involvement of an external administrator
is a distinctive feature of U.S. law. "The United States is probably the
only developed nation that leaves the debtor in unsupervised posses-
sion of the estate during a reorganization. '7
This Article examines whether differences in the countries' reor-
ganization laws affect their reorganization systems' performance. In
particular, one expects Finnish reorganization proceedings to be
more selectively employed, to be quicker, to be less likely to devote
time and energy to hopeless firms, and to generate results more
favorable to creditors.
Our comparative analysis indicates that a greater portion of insol-
vent firms reorganize in the United States than in Finland. These
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that Chapter 11's
prodebtor features attract more filings and induce debtors to file at an
earlier stage of financial difficulty.
We also compare the likelihood that firms emerge from reorgani-
zation with plans allowing them to stay in business. Generally, even
controlling for differences in firms' solvency, the likelihood is lower
3 See, e.g., PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY § 11-7 (1995)
(discussing issues associated with commencing bankruptcy proceedings); Christian Van
Buggenhout & Wrilliam Nauwelaerts, Corporate Insolvency Law in Belgium, in EUROPEAN COR-
PORATE INSOLVENCY. A PRACTICAL GUIDE 23, 33 (Harry Rajak et al. eds., 2d ed., John Wiley
& Sons 1995) (1992) (describing the procedure for filing reorganization petitions in
Belgium).
4 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11?
The Evidence from Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111, 117 (1994) (noting that a neutral, court-
appointed examiner recommends whether a Japanese composition proceeding should
commence).
5 See infra Part I.A.2.
6 See infra Part I-.A2.
7 Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 Am. BANKR. L.J. 573,
576-77 (1995). For a similar view from abroad, see WOOD, supra note 3, §§ 11-37 to 39.
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under the Finnish Code, though the effect is small and not statistically
significant. Thus, despite widespread beliefs that confirmation rates
in the United States are unduly low,8 a similar group of firms, operat-
ing under a similar reorganization law, failed to achieve higher plan
confirmation rates.
Finland's stricter early screening of cases reduces the time
elapsed between the filing and termination of unsuccessful reorgani-
zation cases-those which never confirm a plan. Such Finnish cases
consume, on average, 3.7 months, compared to 8.6 months for U.S.
firms.9 The time pattern is less clear for firms that achieve confirma-
tion of reorganization plans. The average time elapsed between filing
and plan confirmation is 10.9 months for the Finnish firms and 10.7
months for the comparable U.S. sample,' 0 indicating no notable time
difference between the systems. Other studies, however, suggest that
current U.S. proceedings are considerably slower."
Surprisingly, we find no evidence that the U.S. system leads to
reorganization plans that are more favorable to debtors. U.S. debtors
propose to pay unsecured creditors a higher percentage of their
claims than Finnish debtors propose to pay, and also propose a faster
payout. We present evidence that the U.S. law's much-debated abso-
lute priority rule ("APR") induces debtors to propose plans requiring
substantially higher repayments than Finnish reorganization plans re-
quire. Under the APR, a debtor's owners may not retain an owner-
ship interest in the reorganized firm unless the reorganization plan
proposes to pay creditors in full.12 Thus, while Finnish reorganization
mechanics are more procreditor, a substantive rule requiring full pay-
ment to creditors for owners to retain ownership may generate U.S.
plans that are more favorable to creditors. We confirm the favorable
treatment of U.S. unsecured creditors by briefly examining results
from Canada, Japan, and Australia.
8 See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 4, at 113; Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death
Penalty for Debtor and Creditor Interests, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1088 (1992).
9 See infra Part III.C.
10 See infra Part II.C.
11 See Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management and Delay Reduction: An Empirical
Study, 4 AM. BANK. INST. L. Rxv. 85, 100-05 (1996); Lisa Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart,
Measuring Chapter 11: The Real World of 500 Cases, 4 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. Ray. 119, 145-52
(1996); Susan Jensen-Condin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The Results of a
Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297, 327 (1992); Ed Flynn, Statistical Analysis of
Chapter 11, at 23-28 (Oct. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii) (1994). Junior classes may participate if they in-
vest new value in the firm in connection with the reorganization. See In re Bryson Proper-
ties, XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 503-04 (4th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court has left open the
question whether a new value exception to absolute priority exists under the Bankruptcy




Finnish unsecured creditor results are of special interest in light
of the Bebchuk-Fried proposal. As we describe elsewhere, 13 Finnish
law establishes two types of secured creditors: creditors with a fixed
charge on assets and creditors with a floating charge. Creditors with a
floating charge have a security interest in the changing assets of the
firm, including inventory and receivables, and enjoy partial priority.
They receive 50%14 of the proceeds remaining after creditors with a
fixed charge on assets and administrative expenses have been paid. 15
Secured creditors with a fixed charge on a firm's assets have full prior-
ity.16 In the United States, secured creditors enjoy full priority, with
different qualifications.
17
If there were a simple relationship between levels of secured cred-
itor priority and repayment rates to unsecured creditors, one might
expect Finnish unsecured creditors to fare better than U.S. creditors.
We find, however, no hard evidence that partial secured creditor pri-
ority necessarily leads to different payout patterns. The greatest effect
of a partial priority rule may be on ex ante lending behavior to the
mass of firms, most of which do not resort to insolvency proceedings.
Part I of this Article reviews U.S. and Finnish reorganization laws'
similarities and differences, and concludes that they can be compared
meaningfully. It then sets forth predictions about the effects of the
differences in the reorganization schemes. Part II describes the data
used, Part III presents the empirical results, and the Conclusion sum-
marizes our main findings. As with any comparative legal study, cau-
tion must be exercised in concluding that any aspect of the systems is
in fact the same or different.
I
UNITED STATES AND FINISH REORGANIZATION LAws
We present a detailed comparison of Finnish and U.S. reorgani-
zation laws elsewhere' s and summarize only the highlights here. After
briefly describing the laws, we formulate hypotheses about how the
reorganization systems should compare.
13 See Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, Chapter 11 Reorganizations, Debtor
Control, and Absolute Priority: A Comparative Empirical Study 6 (Aug. 26, 1996) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with authors).
14 The priority was 60% until January 1995, which includes the period studied here.
15 See Eisenberg & Sundgren, supra note 13, at 6.
16 See id.
17 See, e.g., THEODORE EISENBERG, BANKRUPTCy AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 583 (2d ed.
1988).
18 Eisenberg & Sundgren, supra note 13.
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A. Reorganization Laws
We divide reorganization law into rules governing commence-
ment of a case and preserving firm value, rules governing communica-
tion of information to help formulate reorganization plans, and rules
governing plan formulation and confirmation. Eligibility for com-
mencement, the need to stay creditor collection efforts, deciding
whether to leave the debtor in control, and determining whether a
reorganization is likely to succeed are crucial early issues. Interested
parties then need information about the debtor to assess reorganiza-
tion prospects and to help formulate and evaluate plans. The power
to propose a plan and the rules governing its confirmation determine
the outcome of the reorganization process.
1. Commencing the Case and Preserving Firm Value
The automatic stay protects U.S. debtors' property from collec-
tion efforts during the reorganization. As described below, under
Finnish law, the stay takes effect after the case passes the initial eligi-
bility screening. 19 Although this screening process may take a couple
of months, the Finnish debtor may apply to the court for a temporary
stay.20 Finnish Reorganization Law ("FinRL") § 6 includes the sol-
vency requirement rules.2' The debtor need not be insolvent if the
debtor, together with creditors representing at least one-fifth of the
debtor's known debts, file the petition jointly.2 2 The court is likely to
stay creditors almost immediately after the filing, if there is reason to
expect that creditors will undertake collection actions and the firm
has even a remote chance of survival.
Staying collection actions helps preserve firm value. A firm's
most important assets include its web of contractual relationships.
Both U.S. and Finnish law allow a debtor to preserve most contractual
relationships during the reorganization process. 23 Both also author-
ize borrowing on a priority basis to fund post-filing operations.2
4
2. Appointment of a Trustee or Administrator
Finnish courts must appoint an administrator unless no creditor
requests it,25 and the court finds appointment to be unnecessary. The
19 See Lag om foretagssanering 25.1.1993/47 § 7 [hereinafter Fin. Reorg. L.].
20 See id. § 22.
21 Id. § 6.
22 See id. § 6.3.
23 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994); Fin. Reorg. L. §§ 27.1-27.3.
24 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1994); Fin. Reorg. L. § 34.
25 Major creditors who the court permits to challenge the debtor's eligibility may also
nominate an administrator, who must be a disinterested party. The court then appoints
the administrator. For a description of the rules regulating the nomination and appoint-
ment of the administrator, see Fin. Reorg. L. § 83.
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administrator, whom the creditors nominate, oversees the debtor's
operations, keeps creditors informed about the debtor's business,
and, if necessary, audits operations prior to the reorganization fil-
ing.2 6 The administrator also is responsible for preparing a reorgani-
zation plan. But the administrator does not replace the debtor-in-
possession's management. Incumbent management can, and usually
does, continue to operate the firm in the ordinary course of busi-
ness.27 Chapter 11 allows for the appointment of a trustee or exam-
iner, but in practice this is rarely done.
3. Terminating Cases Inappropriate for Reorganization
Finland, like many other countries, aggressively screens cases
early in the reorganization process. Shortly after a reorganization fil-
ing, the court must send a notice of the filing to the major creditors.28
If any of these creditors asserts that the case is unsuitable for reorgani-
zation, the court must determine the debtor's eligibility. The court
then uses various ineligibility criteria to determine whether reorgani-
zation proceedings should continue. 29 In the United States, immedi-
ately after the filing, any party in interest may, for cause, request
dismissal of the case or conversion to Chapter 7.30 Early in a reorgani-
zation, however, the standards for conversion or dismissal are strin-
gent: the movant must show that prospects of rehabilitation are
"hopeless and unrealistic."31
26 See id. § 90. Fin. Reorg. L. § 8 lists the administrator's main duties.
27 See Eisenberg & Sundgren, supra note 13, at 9.
28 The court has some discretionary power in deciding which creditors have claims
large enough to be heard. See Fin. Reorg. L. § 70.1; see also PAUIINE KosKELo, YRrrvs-
SANEERAUS 79 (1994) (containing additional details on the initial screening of cases).
29 The key ineligibility criteria are that: (i) it is likely that a reorganization plan can-
not avoid insolvency; (ii) it is likely that the debtor's assets will not satisfy the administrative
expenses of the case; (iii) it is likely that the debtor will be unable to pay debts arising after
initiation of the reorganization; (iv) the main purpose of the filing is to delay creditors
from collecting their claims; (v) there are reasons to expect that creditors will not approve
a reorganization plan; and (vi) the firm's bookkeeping is not reliable. See Fin. Reorg. L.
§ 7.
30 The grounds for conversion or dismissal include continuing losses, the inability to
implement a reorganization plan, and unreasonable delay. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1)-(3)
(1994).
31 4 WiLLiAm L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRupTcy LAW AND PRACICE 2d § 82:4, at 82-
9 to -10 (1994) (quoting cases); see also In re Dark Horse Tavern, 189 B.R. 576, 580 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1995) (conversion or dismissal is a "drastic measure") (citing In re Sal Caruso
Cheese, Inc., 107 B.R. 808, 817 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989)); In re Asbridge, 61 B.R. 97, 102
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) ("Some courts feel that any doubt arising in a section 1112 dismissal
motion ought to be resolved in favor of allowing the debtor to continue with reorganiza-
tion efforts.").
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4. Monitoring the Debtor & Information Disclosures
Information is formally disclosed to interested parties in three
ways: by officers the court appoints, by committees, and by the debtor.
The Finnish administrator is responsible for two important disclosures
to the creditors. First, immediately after appointment, the administra-
tor must furnish to the court comprehensive schedules, including the
debtor's assets, liabilities, and current and expected financial posi-
tion.32 Second, the administrator must submit a disclosure statement
with the reorganization plan to help creditors make an informed judg-
ment about the plan.33 In contrast, the U.S. system relies more on
information disclosure by the debtor's management and
committees. 3
4
5. Preparing, Voting on, and Confirming Reorganization Plans
Chapter 11 debtors have the exclusive right, for 120 days, to file a
plan. The court may extend the exclusivity period,3 5 which is a com-
mon practice.3 6 Often, no single creditor has the resources and in-
centives needed to develop and confirm a plan.37 Thus, the debtor's
management often prepares the plan even after the exclusivity period
expires. In comparison, the Finnish administrator is mainly responsi-
ble for preparing a reorganization plan, although other parties may
propose plans.38 Generally, the administrator must submit a plan
within a court-specified time period, normally not more than four
months.3 9
Under both Finnish and U.S. law, reorganization plans can be
confirmed in more than one way. Under the Finnish Code, a plan
that all classes approve may be confirmed.40 Absent approval of all
classes, at least one class of creditors along with creditors representing
at least one-fifth, of the amount of all debts must vote for the plan.4 1 A
plan cannot be confirmed if a disapproving creditor shows that it
would receive more in liquidation.42 In the United States, approval of
all impaired classes also supports confirmation. As in Finland, un-
32 See Fin Reorg. L. § 8.1.
33 See id- § 41 (listing the types of information that the disclosure statement should
provide).
34 See FED. R BANER P. 1007(b)-(c).
35 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1994).
36 See DOUGLAS G. BMIR, THE ELMENrs OF BANEiuPTCY 244 (rev. ed. 1993).
37 See id. at 245; Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 4, at 139 (showing that average
claim size affects the outcome of Japanese compositions).
38 See Fin. Reorg. L. § 8.
39 See id. §§ 40, 73.
40 Id. § 51.
41 See id. § 54. A third way to have a plan approved is by the consent of all known
creditors. See id. § 50.
42 Se id. § 53.1(5).
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secured creditors must receive at least what they would receive in a
liquidation. 43  Absent approval by all classes, the debtor can
"cramdown" a plan over a dissenting class's objection if the plan is
"fair and equitable."44 If unsecured claims are not proposed to be
paid in full, the fair and equitable requirement mandates that junior
classes (usually equity) not receive any distribution or retain any own-
ership in the firm.
45
B. Similarities and Differences
The two countries' laws are alike in many important respects.
Although involuntary filings by creditors are possible under both
codes, filings by debtors dominate in both systems. Both countries'
codes provide for an immediate or near immediate stay of creditors
during the reorganization proceedings. Both countries allow debtors
to preserve pending contracts and obtain post-filing credit on a prior-
ity basis. Both allow reorganization plans to affect secured creditors'
rights. Both require that payments under a plan at least equal what
creditors would receive in liquidation. And both codes allow for plan
approval without the consent of all creditor classes. Table 1 summa-
rizes the principal similarities and differences between the codes.
TABiLE 1. PRiNCIPAL SImraARIEs AND DIFFERENCES:
U.S. AND FINNISH REORGANIZATION LAws
A. Similarities
Debtor almost always commences proceedings
Automatic or temporary stay against creditor actions routinely granted
Debtor may preserve pending contracts
Reorganization plan is the centerpiece of both systems
Plan must pay at least what creditors would receive in liquidation
Plan may modify rights of secured and unsecured creditors
Debtor may borrow on a priority basis
Creditors vote on plan after disclosure of material information
Plan may be confirmed despite dissenting class of creditors ("cramdown")
B. Differences
Administrator appointed in Finland; managers usually control U.S. proceedings
Finnish creditors may object, early in the proceedings, to commencement; U.S.
standards for early dismissal or conversion are more pro-debtor
Finnish administrator prepares plan and information disclosures; U.S. debtors
are responsible
Finland provides only partial priority for claims secured by a floating charge
"Cramdown" standards: United States requires absolute priority; Finland requires
20% approval
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7) (A) (ii) (1994).
44 Id. § 1129(b).
45 See id. § 1129(b) (2) (B) (ii). For references to the new-value exception to absolute
priority, see supra note 12.
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Two main differences between the countries' codes are Finland's
more substantive early screening of cases, and its routine appointment
of administrators. 46 Finnish creditors may immediately challenge a
case's eligibility for reorganization, and the court then determines
whether the case is eligible. U.S. law allows creditors to seek dismissal
of the case or its conversion to liquidation. It is, however, difficult to
convert cases early in the proceedings. In practice, the Finnish
screening process proves more stringent.
Finland's use of an administrator may be the most important dif-
ference between the two countries' laws. The administrator is respon-
sible for early dissemination of information, investigation of the
debtor, preparation of the reorganization plan, and disclosure of in-
formation about the plan. In the United States, the debtor typically
performs these functions. Finland thus provides a natural setting in
which to test the effect of early screening and reduced debtor control.
A third difference, the effect of which is difficult to project, is the
standard for confirming a plan over the objection of unsecured credi-
tors, the cramdown. The U.S.'s APR requires that the firm pay ob-
jecting unsecured creditors in full if owners are to retain control of
the firm. Finland requires only that one-fifth of creditors approve the
plan. This difference's impact is difficult to project because studies
show that absolute priority is often violated,47 and because it is not
clear how easy it is to satisfy Finland's one-fifth rule.
C. Predictions Based on Reorganization Law Differences
1. The Decision to File and Solvency at the Time of Filing
Looser screening and greater debtor control should make Chap-
ter 11 more attractive to U.S. debtors than Finnish reorganization is to
Finnish debtors. The U.S. debtor's four-month exclusive right to pro-
pose a plan is a valuable advantage. 48 Lenient treatment of managers
46 See supra Parts I.A.1-2.
47 See Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority
Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457, 1468 (1990); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 126 (1990); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution:
Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27J. FIN. EcoN. 285, 286 (1990).
48 Game theoretic models of bargaining over a shrinking pie suggest that the party
making the first proposal will capture a little more than its proportionate share of the pie.
See ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPuED EcoNoMIsTs 68-71 (1992); Ariel Ruben-
stein, Perfect Equilibrium in a BargainingMode 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982). Baird, Gertner,
and Picker claim that the debtor's management can propose reorganization plans under
which creditors receive only the liquidation value of the assets, leaving the debtor's owners




increases the incentive to file a timely petition. 49 Thus, a greater pro-
portion of financially troubled U.S. firms should file for reorganiza-
tion, and they should file earlier than Finnish firms.
Easier access and more lenient treatment in the United States
may induce weaker firms to file petitions. Weak Finnish firms may not
even try to reorganize because they know that an ineligibility criterion
may apply. This should lead to some U.S. filings with weaker financial
characteristics. This effect may offset the greater incentive in the
United States to file early, which should lead to filings by firms at a
healthier, earlier stage.
2. Probability of Confirming a Plan
The probability of confirming a reorganization plan depends
both on the financial profiles of firms that file and on how the coun-
tries' different reorganization systems process filings. The additional
U.S. firms that a more pro-debtor regime attracts should be relatively
poor prospects for reorganization. The earlier expected filings by
U.S. firms, however, could temper this effect. Firms that file earlier
are presumably in better financial condition than firms that file later.
They may, ex ante, have better-than-average prospects of confirming a
plan. The expected financial profiles of firms that file thus provide
ambiguous guidance in forecasting plan confirmation rates in the two
countries.
Given firms in equivalent financial condition, differences in case
processing point toward higher U.S. plan confirmation rates. The
literature suggests two reasons why debtors may successfully enjoy con-
firmation of plans that ought to be rejected. First, creditors are not
well enough informed to identify which firms should reorganize and
which ones should not. In the United States, unlike Finland, the
debtor prepares most of the information disclosed about the debtor
and the reorganization plan.50 Debtors have an incentive to bias the
presentation of information and to make a reorganization appear as
favorable as possible. U.S. creditors may not be well-informed when
49 See MichelleJ. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a FilteringDevice: Chapter 11 Reorganiza-
tions and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10J.L. ECON. & ORG. 268, 277-78 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter White, Filtering]; MichelleJ. White, Survey Evidence on Business Bankruptcy, in CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCy. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 298, 301 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Law-
rence A. Weiss eds., 1996).
Congress accepted the view that routinely replacing the debtor's management would
reduce the incentive to file timely petitions. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 233-34 (1977).
For a summary of empirical results suggesting that U.S. managers in Chapter 11 do not
fare as well as believed, see Theodore Eisenberg, Baseline Problems in Assessing Chapter 11, 43
U. TORONTO L.J. 633, 663 n.142 (1993).
50 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3016(b) (disclosure statement must be filed with reorganiza-
tion plan).
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voting on the plan. As a consequence, U.S. creditors may erroneously
approve many reorganization plans.51
Second, valuation procedures in cramdown situations are not rig-
orous. It has been asserted that U.S. courts may cramdown reorgani-
zation plans prescribing continued operations even where creditors
would have received more in liquidation. "Given the costs of asserting
its rights [in a cramdown], a creditor may be better off consenting to a
plan, even if it would have done better in Chapter 7."52
Finnish law reduces these biases towards reorganization. A credi-
tor-nominated outside administrator proposes the plan and discloses
information about the plan. Administrators who fail to satisfy credi-
tors reduce their future appointment opportunities.53
We thus expect that, holding financial condition constant, U.S.
firms will achieve plan confirmation at greater rates than Finnish
firms. Expected differences in the financial profiles of firms that file
in the two countries may obscure this effect.
3. Time in Reorganization Proceedings
Time is money in reorganization proceedings for several reasons.
Administrative expenses are likely to increase with case length.54
Lengthy proceedings delay the movement of assets to more produc-
tive uses for economically inefficient firms. Losses during reorganiza-
tion consume value that otherwise could be distributed to creditors.
The very pendency of reorganization proceedings may affect the
likelihood of successfully conducting business. During the reorganiza-
tion, the firm's future is uncertain. Warranties and expectations of
future services are of little value. This may make buyers reluctant to
engage in business with the firm.55 Uncertainties about the firm's fu-
ture decrease when reorganization proceedings end.
51 See White, Filtering, supra note 49, for a game theoretical model in this spirit.
52 BAIRD, supra note 36, at 255. "Moreover . . . the valuation procedures under
[cramdowns] are not rigorous." Id.
53 Fama argues that markets and reputation solve agency problems between princi-
pals (creditors in our framework) and an agent (the administrator). Eugene F. Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 289 (1980). However, this
can be only partly true when interests of different creditors may conflict. The agent may
then act only in certain creditors' interests. Moreover, Holmstr6m shows that markets do
not solve all agency problems and that effective contracts are needed. If contracts between
the agent and creditors are imperfect, suboptimal behavior may emerge. Bengt Holm-
strhm, Managerial Incentive Problems-A Dynamic Perspective, in EssAYs IN ECONOMICS AND
MANAGEMENT IN HONOR OF LARS WAHLBECK 209 (Bj6rn Wahlroos et al., eds., 1982).
54 See LoPucki, supra note 7, at 576.
55 Titman presents a model in which customers who need servicing of their products
will buy only at lower prices when liquidation is likely. Sheridan Titman, The Effect of Capi-
tal Structure on a Firm's Liquidation Decision, 13J. FIN. ECON. 137 (1984). The value of war-
ranties is also low if there is a high risk that the firm will go out of business.
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Finally, the time spent in reorganization may be costly because
the incentives of managers (acting in the interest of owners) may be
inappropriate. During reorganization, corporate owners are in a posi-
tion to benefit from increases in firm value, but creditors bear the
losses from decreases in firm value. Thus, owners and managers may
have an incentive to undertake risky projects even if the expected pay-
off is negative.
56
U.S. law gives the debtor considerable control over the timing of
various stages of the reorganization, particularly through the right to
propose the first reorganization plan. Finnish law gives the adminis-
trator, and thus indirectly the creditors, more control over timing. If
all parties were well informed, controlling the timing of the proceed-
ings might not matter. To minimize costs, the party in control would
propose a plan as soon as possible after filing, and claimholders would
share the gains from prompt proceedings.
In practice, however, it takes considerable time to reach an agree-
ment. This may result from asymmetric information. Uncertainty
exists about the firm's true situation and it takes time to evaluate in-
formation and proposals.57 Information problems should be reduced
in the Finnish system, where the administrator, nominated by credi-
tors, prepares the plan and information disclosures. Creditors may
more readily rely on information disclosed, and plans are more likely
to be feasible. U.S. proceedings may also be slower because pressure
on management to operate the firm efficiently may diminish during
reorganization. During that time, no payments on unsecured debt,
and reduced payments on secured debt, may be made. This implies
that managers need to make a lesser effort to meet the current obliga-
tions of the business than if a reorganization plan were approved. Fi-
nally, firms that should liquidate, given the available information,
benefit from delaying liquidation. If a firm stays in business, a remote
chance exists that conditions will improve and that it will become opti-
mal to continue to operate the firm.
56 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729, 732-39, for
a discussion of agency problems during reorganization proceedings. Reorganization law
limits management opportunities to take actions that increase the value of equity, but re-
duce firm value. Both U.S. and Finnish Codes specify that the debtor's management may,
without court approval, undertake certain activities only in the ordinary course of business.
11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b) (1), 364(a) (1994); Fin. Reorg. L. § 27. Further, monitoring activities
by the administrator in Finland and creditor committees in the United States further re-
duce this risk. But monitoring activities do not eliminate the problem. Management is
likely to be better informed than the monitors about the riskiness and payoffs of projects.
57 Game-theoretic models of sequential bargaining under complete information sug-
gest that an agreement is reached without delay. An agreement is not necessarily reached
during the first round of negotiations if parties are asymmetrically informed, see GIBBONS
supra note 48, at 68-71, 218-24, which is likely to be the case in a bankruptcy
reorganization.
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In addition, Finnish reorganization law contains a rule to expe-
dite cases. It specifies that the administrator must propose a plan
within a court-specified time limit-usually not more than four
months.58 U.S. law lacks a similar provision. We thus expect Finnish
reorganization proceedings to progress more quickly than U.S.
proceedings.
4. Terms of Reorganization Plans
Finnish creditors nominate the administrator, who prepares the
reorganization plan. One expects Finnish plans to be more creditor-
oriented, leaving the debtor's owners with a smaller share of the going
concern's surplus. One qualification to this prediction is necessary
because of different cramdown standards. Under the U.S.'s APR,
owners should not retain any interest in the reorganized firm unless
the reorganization plan proposes to pay creditors in full. Thus, debt-
ors wishing to retain ownership interests may be forced to propose
paying creditors in full.
59
The pro-creditor tenor of Finnish law should route value towards
creditors and away from debtors. The limited priority of Finnish se-
cured creditors should further increase payment rates to unsecured
creditors over the rates paid to U.S. unsecured creditors.
In summary, we expect U.S. law to attract more firms, and U.S.
reorganizations to perhaps produce higher confirmation rates, take
longer, and generate plans more favorable to owners and managers,
and less favorable to unsecured creditors.
II
DATA DESCRIPTION
Empirically testing the effect of early screening and reduced
debtor control requires data from both countries about similar reor-
ganizing firms. Firm size and industry substantially affect the pros-
pects for, and outcome of, reorganization.
In the United States, differences in firm size translate into differ-
ent rates of payment, confirmation, and completion of reorganization
plans. The confirmation rate for firms with at least $100 million in
public debt is over 90%.60 More than one-third of the firms with as-
58 Fin. Reorg. L. §§ 40, 73.
59 In the United States and other systems, debtors may be able to avoid the APR and
discharge unsecured debts through bargain sales to insiders, see LYNN M. LoPucKi, STRATE-
GIES FOR CREDrroRs IN BANKRUPTcY PROCEEDINGS § 11.11.2 (2d ed. 1991), and through tacit
agreements with secured creditors. See EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 13-14, 39-43. The im-
pact of such techniques on reorganization law is beyond the scope of our data.
60 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 COmLL L. REv. 597, 600 (1993).
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sets greater than $1 million have their plans confirmed and less than
20% of the firms with assets of less than $1 million receive confirma-
tion.6a Comparison with other countries also suggests that firm size
affects reorganization prospects. In both Canada and Japan, larger
firms comprise a greater fraction of reorganizing firms than in the
United States, and both countries have higher plan confirmation rates
than the United States.
62
A firm's line of business may also affect reorganization chances.
For example, bankruptcy and reorganization filing rates may be high
in a depressed industry. Bankruptcy studies show industry effects in
reorganization. 6
3
Given the need to control for firm size and industry, a tradeoff
arises between using a representative sample of firms in both coun-
tries and using a less representative sample of firms that match by size
and industry. We use here a fairly complete sample of Finnish firms
and compare them with data on U.S. firms that share the size and
industry characteristics of the Finnish firms. Where appropriate, we
also refer to other studies of U.S. firms.
A. The Finnish and U.S. Samples
The Finnish data we use are from documents in district courts,
courts of appeal, and the Finnish Supreme Court. Complementary
data come from the files of Asiakastieto Oy, a Finnish credit bureau.
The data cover ten of the nineteen Finnish district courts in which
debtors file reorganization petitions. The data include cases filed
from February 1993 to February 1994. Filings in the covered districts
constituted about 73.5% of all reorganization filings during 1993.64
The sample consists only of nonpublic, nonfarm firms. 65 A total of
362 reorganization cases were identified. Of these, 102 firms emerged
from reorganization proceedings with a confirmed plan.
61 See EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 57 tbl.5; Flynn, supra note 11, at 34 tbl.31. For a
review of studies showing reorganization success rates, see STEFAN SUNDGREN, BANKRuPrcy
COSTS AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: A CASE STUDY OF THE FINNISH CODE 68-71 (1995).
62 See EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 56-58. But see TIMOTHY C.G. FISHER &JOCELYN MAR-
TEL, SHOULD WE ABOLISH CHAIPTER 11? EVIDENCE FROM CANADA, 13-14 (CiRANo, Sci. Ser.
No. 96s-22, 1996) (presenting evidence that firm size does not influence the Canadian
confirmation rate).
63 See SUNDGREN, supra note 61, at 130-32 (manufacturing dummy variable statistically
significant in modeling reorganization and sale as a going concern); Eisenberg &
Tagashira, supra note 4, app. at 156-57 tblsAl-A2 (showing significant industry effects in
denial of confirmation of Japane'se composition plans).
64 See Statistical Office of Finland, Bankruptcies 1993, JUSTICE, Apr. 12, 1994, at 5, 28.
65 All nonpublic firms, except one very large one, EKA, that filed a petition during
the sampling period are included in the sample. EKA was omitted because of its very
different characteristics.
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For U.S. firms, two studies published detailed data about nonpub-
lic firms in Chapter 11. Lynn LoPucki studied all Chapter 11 cases
filed in the Western District of Missouri during the first year after the
effective date of Chapter 11-October 1979 to October 1980.66 Je-
rome Kerkman examined a random sample of 48 of 152 Chapter 11
filings in the Eastern District of Wisconsin during 1982.67 He followed
LoPucki's methodology and collected data similar to LoPucki's.
68
Eliminating farm filings reduces Kerkman's sample to 44 firms and
LoPucki's sample to 45 firms. Unless otherwise indicated, references
to U.S. data are to the combined LoPucki and Kerkman samples.
B. Comparability of the Samples
We first examine whether the Finnish and U.S. data contain firms
of comparable size, with similar distributions across industries. Table
2, panel A, shows the similarity of the industry distribution of the
firms. Retail and wholesale firms constitute about 30% of both sam-
ples, manufacturing firms make up 23% of the Finnish sample and
29% of the U.S. sample, and construction firms make up 11% of the
Finnish sample and 9% of the U.S. sample. One cannot reject the
hypothesis that the distribution of firms by industry in the Finnish and
U.S. samples is the same.
69
66 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code? 57 Am. BANKR. L.J. 99, app. at 118-26 (1983) (containing charts with infor-
mation on debtors' assets, shareholders' equity, type of business, time elapsed in reorgani-
zation, and terms of plans proposed to unsecured creditors).
67 Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Controk A Case for Adoption of the Trustee Sys-
tent, 70 MARQ. L. Rav. 159, 163 (1987).
68 Id. The Kerkman data used here come from id. app. at 201-09.
69 Pearson e2 (5) = 6.170, with a corresponding significance level (or p-value) = .290.
The p-value provides a measure of the probability that one would observe by chance differ-




TABLE 2. INDUSTRY AND SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMs BY COUNTRY
FINNIsH FIRMS U.S. FIRMS
N % N %
A. Distribution by Industry
Manufacturing 84 23.2 26 29.2
Construction 39 10.7 8 9.0
Retail trade/wholesale 111 30.5 27 30.3
Transportation 39 10.7 4 4.5
Real estate 39 10.7 7 7.9
Other services & unknown 50 13.7 17 19.1
Total 362 89
B. Distribution by Size (assets in thousands of 1992 U.S. dollars)
Mean 2,100 2,257
Median 601 530
First quartile less than: 180 161




Table 2, panel B, describes the firms' assets. U.S. asset values are
inflated to reflect the later time period, and corresponding increases
in price levels, covered by the Finnish data. 70 No significant differ-
ences between the asset distributions emerge. The mean of the assets
of the Finnish firms is $2.10 million and the mean of the assets of the
U.S. firms is $2.26 million. The median of the assets of the Finnish
firms is $601,000 and the median of the assets of the U.S. firms is
$530,000. About 25% of the Finnish firms have assets below $180,000
and about 25% have assets above $1.79 million. The corresponding
figures for the U.S. firms are $161,000 and $1.48 million, respectively.
Statistical tests reveal no significant difference in the distributions of
assets across the Finnish and U.S. firms.
7'
Corporations, partnerships, and businesses run by individuals
may file a petition under both Codes. Of the Finnish debtors, 222
(62%) are corporations, 104 (29%) are partnerships, and 31 (9%) are
businesses run by individuals. In the U.S. data, 74 debtors (83%) are
corporations and 15 (17%) are individuals.
70 Amounts were inflated with Consumer Price Indices, taken from U.N. DEP'T OF
INT'L ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, Nov. 1986, at 218, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SERQ/ 167; U.N. DEP'T FOR ECON. & SOC. INFO. & POucy ANALYSIS
STATISnCAL Div., MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISnCS, Dec. 1994, at 196, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/
STAT/SERJQ/264. Finnish Reorganization Law requires that annual financial statements,
or interim ones if the annual are more than four months old, be included with the reor-
ganization filing. F. om fbretagssanering [Ordinance on Reorg.] 25.1.1993/55 § 1.4. Asset
amounts are taken from these filings. Given that most of the financial statements are from
1992, U.S. amounts were inflated to reflect 1992 prices.
71 The Kruskal-Wallis test of distribution of assets by country (p = .55), the one-way
analysis of variance of assets by country (p = .831), the one-way analysis of variance of
logarithm of assets by country (p = .603), and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality
of distributions (p = .919) support this conclusion.
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Although the Finnish data are representative of the year covered,
we lack a representative sample of U.S. firms or districts. Our U.S.
sample comes from two districts, not from a random sample of dis-
tricts or from a comprehensive sample of many districts; U.S. reorgan-
ization results are known to vary by district. 2 But our purpose is not
to portray the complete, current U.S. experience. We wish to study
the performance of the two reorganization systems as they apply to
comparable firms. We have, in two important dimensions, size and
industry, comparable groups of firms. The U.S. and Finnish data also
correspond in another important dimension. The Finnish reorganiza-
tion law is new, and thus all debtors and lawyers need not necessarily
have learned about the possible advantages of reorganization. Both
the LoPucki and Kerkman data come from a time period shortly after
the enactment of the new Chapter 11. Thus, the same learning-curve
issue applies to the U.S. data used here. Whether reorganization re-
sults for similar U.S. firms would differ in other districts, or results for
both countries would differ in other years, is beyond this study.
We can, however, test whether the studied U.S. districts achieve
results comparable to Finland's. This is important because it can help
isolate whether problems with U.S. reorganizations are structural ones
inherent in Chapter 11 or are of a localized nature.
Ill
EMpnucL RESULTS
The assertion that Finland's reorganization law is more
procreditor depends in large part on greater participation by outsid-
ers in the reorganization process. We thus first check for the more
regular appointment of administrators in Finland than the appoint-
ment of trustees in the United States. Table 3, which contains ap-
pointment rates for administrators and trustees, as well as summary
statistics for other variables, confirms our assumption. An outside ad-
ministrator was appointed in 154 of 156 cases (98.7%) that passed the
initial screening. An administrator was appointed in all cases that
passed the initial screening but were later terminated. For the firms
successfully reorganized, an administrator was appointed in 96 of the
98 Finnish cases (98.0%). 73 The percentage is much lower in the
United States. A trustee was appointed in 10.2% of the U.S. cases and
an examiner in 5.7% of the cases. 74
72 See Flynn, supra note 11, at 14-34.
73 The two remaining cases were unusual because they had very few creditors: one
had two and the other had four. Appointment information was unavailable in three termi-
nated cases and five successfully reorganized cases. An outside administrator is not ap-
pointed if the case fails the initial screening.
74 A trustee was appointed in five, and an examiner in four, of the forty-five LoPucki
study cases included in our sample. A trustee was appointed in four, and an examiner in
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10.7 10.0 34 10.9 10.0 102 .867
8.6 7.0 45 3.7 2.5 251 <.001
64.0 80.0 33 42.9 37.0 85 <.001
34.2 36.0 33 72.9 66.0 82 <.001
*Note: If the four pending U.S. cases were treated as confirmed,
would be .365.
**See infra note 82.
the confirmation rate
A. The Decision to File and Solvency at the Time of Filing
Chapter 11 attracts firms at a higher rate than Finland's law. In
1993, the year Finland's reorganization law took effect, reorganization
filings constituted 8.5% of business insolvency filings.75 In 1994, they
constituted 7.7%.76 The United States has a higher rate of reorganiza-
tion usage. Indeed, U.S. reorganization use is among the highest in
the world.77 In fiscal 1991, reorganization proceedings comprised
about 45% of U.S. business insolvency filings.78 Throughout the
just one, of the forty-four Kerkman study cases included in the sample. In one case, no
information was provided.
75 To make Finnish and U.S. figures more comparable, Finnish involuntary bank-
ruptcy liquidation filings that were interrupted before any further proceedings took place,
usually due to the debtor having paid the creditor who filed the petition, were omitted.
Such Finnish filings are more akin to U.S. state-law collection actions. Farmer filings were
excluded from the Finnish reorganizations. Farmers can file under a separate chapter
(Chapter 12) in the United States. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1994).
76 Many Finnish liquidating bankruptcy filers had no or very few assets. Bankruptcy
liquidation proceedings terminate if assets are insufficient to pay administrative expenses.
In 1993, these cases comprised 43.2% of cases and, in 1994, 41.3% of the cases. A firm
probably will not try to reorganize with very few assets. If these cases are excluded, reor-
ganization filings represent only about 14% and 13% of the 1993 and 1994 insolvency
filings, respectively. U.S. figures also include zero asset cases.
77 See EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 10-11.
78 See id. at 10. The 45% figure includes filings under Chapters 12 and 13 as well as
Chapter 11. If one excludes Chapter 12 farm filings, the reorganization filing rate was
29.7% of business filings. If one counts only Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings, Chapter 11
accounted for about one-third of the business insolvency filings. These figures are based
on the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts's data, available on computer disks. For
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1980s, Chapter 11 filings consistently exceeded 30% of business fail-
ures, as reported by Dun & Bradstreet.79 During the 1990s, reorgani-
zation filings regularly exceeded 24% of all business insolvency
filings.80 The Eastern District of Wisconsin and the Western District
of Missouri, discussed here, also show Chapter 11 rates exceeding
Finnish reorganization rates.8' U.S. firms' high Chapter 11 rate is
consistent with Chapter 11's reputation as pro-debtor.
As noted above, high U.S. reorganization rates generate mixed
influences on the financial profiles of reorganizing firms. Chapter
11's attractiveness to debtors should encourage a high fraction of
firms to file and their filings should occur at an earlier stage. The
early-filing effect should increase the U.S. firms' solvency relative to
Finnish firms, but the high-rate effect should decrease solvency. Thus,
equally situated firms should file earlier in the United States, but the
group of filing firms may have different financial characteristics.
To analyze firms' financial health at filing, we compared U.S. and
Finnish firms' solvency at the time of filing. By some measures, the
firms are not noticeably different in their solvencies. The average re-
organizing firm in each country has a negative net worth. The me-
dian solvency ratio (the ratio of shareholders' equity to total assets) is
-.29 for the Finnish firms and -.25 for the U.S. firms. A somewhat
higher percentage of Finnish firms have a negative net worth, 78.4%
compared to 62.9% of the U.S. firms.
Closer inspection of the solvency distributions shows that Finnish
firms' solvency is more concentrated just below and around zero. U.S.
concerns about the reliability of the Administrative Office's bankruptcy data, see Fenning
& Hart, supra note 11, at 120-22.
79 See Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 660 fig.2.
80 See 1994 ANN. RE'. DIP- ADMIN. OFF. U.S. Crs., AI-186 tbl.F-2 [hereinafter 1994 AO
REPORT] (Chapter 11 comprised 13,379 of 54,425 (24.6%) business bankruptcy filings);
1993 ANm. REP. DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. Crs., AI-190 tbl.F-2 [hereinafter 1993 AO REPORT]
(Chapter 11 comprised 17,068 of 64,857 (26.3%) business bankruptcy filings); 1992 ANN.
REP. DiR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., 316 tbl.F-2 [hereinafter 1992 AO REPORT] (Chapter 11
comprised 20,070 of 71,725 (28.0%) business bankruptcy filings).
81 For fiscal 1992, 1993, and 1994, for example, Chapter 11 filings in the Eastern
District of Wisconsin were, respectively, 15.2%, 21.1%, and 11.5% of the business filings
under Chapters 7, 11, and 13. See 1992 AO REPORT, supra note 80, at 317 tbl.F-2; 1993 AO
REPORT, supra note 80, at AI-191 tbl.F-2; 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 80, at AI-187 tbl.F-2.
The percentages for the same three years for the Western District of Missouri were 16.3%,
20.4%, and 21.6%. See 1992 AO REPORT, supra note 80, at 318 tbl.F-2; 1993 AO REPORT,
supra note 80, at AI-191 tbl.F-2; 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 80, at Al-187 tbl.F-2. For fiscal
year 1982, the year with published data most closely corresponding to the Kerkman sam-
ple, 85 of 476 (17.9%) of business bankruptcy filings in the Eastern District of Wisconsin
were Chapter 11 filings. See 1982 ANN. REP. DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. 401 tbl.F3A. For
the nine-month period endingJune 30, 1980, the period with published data most closely
corresponding to the LoPucki sample, 36 of 407 (8.8%) of business bankruptcy filings in
the Western District of Missouri were Chapter 11 filings. See 1980 ANN. REP. DIR. ADMIN.
OFF. U.S. Crs. 562 tbl.F-3BC.
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firms tend to have both higher and lower solvency ratios. One-fourth
of the Finnish firms have ratios less than -.91 and one-fourth have ra-
tios higher than -.03. The corresponding quartiles for the U.S. firms
are -1.63 and .54. Figure 1 shows the distribution of solvency ratios for
the Finnish and U.S. firms, with solvency ratios transformed to a loga-
rithmic scale. 82 Descriptive statistics for this "adjusted solvency" mea-
sure are reported in Table 3 above.
Figure 1 suggests that, despite small differences in mean and me-
dian solvency, the distributions are different, a result that is statisti-
cally significant.83 The U.S. solvency ratios' distribution is consistent
with the predictions that the U.S. Code attracts more firms and
causes them to file at an earlier phase. The early-filing firms are likely
to be more solvent, and may account for the greater concentration of
U.S. firms at the right tail of the solvency distribution. The greater
rate at which U.S. firms seek to reorganize suggests that U.S. filings
should include a concentration of more marginal firms with low sol-
vency ratios. This concentration of relatively low solvency firms could
explain the greater concentration of U.S. firms in the left tail of the
solvency distribution. Finland's reorganization law attracts firms with
solvency ratios away from the high and low solvency extremes.
Which effect dominates? Since firm solvency may depend on
firm characteristics such as size and industry, it is important to control
for these factors when comparing intercountry solvency patterns. In a
regression that assesses solvency, while controlling for size and indus-
try, the country dummy variable (equal to one for U.S. cases and zero
for Finnish cases) has a positive sign, implying that U.S. firms tend to
be more solvent, although only marginally significantly so (p-value =
.074) .84
82 The logarithm of the absolute value of the solvency ratio (as a percent) was taken,
and then the initial sign restored. Figure 1 shows the kernel density estimates for this
solvency measure. The more traditional way of portraying univariate statistical distribu-
tions, the histogram, can be thought of as a kind of kernel density estimator. Kernel den-
sity estimates have the advantage of being smooth and independent of bin location, a
choice that can profoundly shape the appearance of a histogram. For a brief discussion of,
and references about, kernel density estimation, see 2 STATA CoRP., STATA REFERENCE MAN-
uAL: RELEASE 5.0, 288-95 (1997).
83 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of distributions, using a logarithmic
transformation of solvency, yields p = .004. The corresponding p-value for the unadjusted
solvency measure is .005.
84 We present regression results using robust standard errors since heteroskedasticity
can be a problem when two subsamples are compared in a regression. See Halbert White, A
Heteroskedasticity-Gonsistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticiy, 48
ECONOMErRICA 817 (1980).
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FIGuRE 1. KERNEL DENSriY EsTiMATEs OF SOLVENCY DIsTRBuTIoNs
These results suggest that Chapter l1's inducements to file early
overpower its attractiveness to financially weak firms, the type that pre-
sumably file for liquidation in Finland. Although Chapter 11 also at-
tracts this group of weaker firms, U.S. firms on the whole are no less
solvent than Finnish firms seeking to reorganize. A complementary
explanation of U.S. firms' greater solvency relates to macroeconomic
conditions. Both countries suffered from recessions during the years
studied. Finland's recession, however, was deeper.85 Poor
macroeconomic conditions may imply that firms have weaker finan-
cial characteristics when they file a petition.
But it is not clear that macroeconomic conditions account for the
differing shapes of the solvency distributions. Poorer macroeconomic
85 The trend in the industrial production index shows that both countries suffered
from recessions during the years of the filings, but that the recession was deeper in Fin-
land. In Finland, industrial production fell sharply a couple of years prior to the year of
the study, 9% (from 182 to 120) between 1990 and 1991. After that, industrial production
increased 2% from 1991 to 1992, and 6% from 1992 to 1993. LoPucki's sample originates
from 1979 to 1980, and Kerkman's sample from 1982. The corresponding U.S. index
shows growth of 6% from 1977 to 1978, growth of 4% from 1978 to 1979, a decline of 3%
from 1979 to 1980, growth of 2% from 1980 to 1981, and a sharp decline of 8% from 1981
to 1982. Indices are taken from U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECON. & Soc. AFFAmRs, MONTHLY
BULLETN OF STATISTICS, July 1983, at 24, 30, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.Q/127 and
U.N. DEP'T FOR ECON. & Soc. INFO. & Pouicy ANALYsis STATISTICAL Div., MONTHLY BuLL-
TIN OF STATISTICS, Sept. 1995, at 26, 32, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.QJ273.
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conditions may imply that the whole Finnish solvency distribution
should, compared to the U.S. distribution, be shifted to the left in
Figure 1. Different macroeconomic conditions do not necessarily
forecast such different shapes in the distributions.
B. Probability of Adopting a Reorganization Plan
Differences between the countries' reorganization laws offered
no firm prediction about comparative plan confirmation rates. The
data reveal no substantial differences.
Table 3 shows that 28.2% (102 of 362) of the Finnish firms
emerged from reorganization proceedings with a confirmed plan.
Only two of the plans were liquidation plans. Thus, 100 firms (27.6%)
emerged with plans allowing the firm to stay in business. Excluding
liquidation plans, the rate of confirmed plans in the LoPucki/
Kerkman sample is 31.8%, or 36.5% if cases pending when the study
was conducted were assumed to be eventually confirmed.8 6 The
higher U.S. rate casts some doubt on the stereotypical view of Chapter
11 as having unusually low confirmation rates.
One possibility is that differences in solvency, firm size, and in-
dustry distribution explain the confirmation rates. Perhaps, holding
these other factors constant, the U.S. confirmation rate is, in fact,
lower. We have explored regression models testing whether U.S.
firms' higher rate of emerging from reorganization proceedings with
an operating plan correlates with solvency, firm size, or industry distri-
bution. Based on these regressions, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that, controlling for solvency, size, and industry, U.S. and Finnish
firms achieve confirmation at the same rate.
One concern is that the two U.S. districts studied may not be rep-
resentative. Perhaps these two districts confirm plans at higher rates
than other districts. The best available data covering a broad geo-
graphic base come from Flynn's report on Chapter 11 confirmation
patterns.87 Flynn's reported confirmation rates do not appear to ac-
count for consolidation of cases, which Flynn reports as substantial
and varying depending on firm size.88 Because confirmation rates
LoPucki and Kerkman report do account for consolidations,8 9 some
adjustment is needed to achieve comparable confirmation rates.90
86 Four cases from Kerkman's study were omitted since different tables gave conflict-
ing information regarding their outcomes. Note also that the confirmation rates differ
somewhat from those reported in the published studies because farm debtors were omitted
from the sample.
87 Flynn, supra note 11.
88 Id. at 13-16.
89 LoPucki, supra note 66, at 101 n.7; Kerkman, supra note 67, at 163 n.33.
90 Using all filings, rather than consolidated filings, to measure confirmation rates
will understate confirmation rates because consolidated confirmed cages will be reported
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Flynn reports consolidation rates and confirmation rates by case
size.91 This allows us to compute national confirmation rates for dif-
ferent firm sizes, adjusted to reflect consolidation rates. Row (2) in
Table 4 provides consolidation-adjusted confirmation rates that can
be applied to firms in the four asset ranges the Table's columns
specif.
92
TABLE 4. Frm SIZE AND CONFIRMATION RATES
Firm Size by Assets (in thousands)
less than$100 $100-500 $500-1,000 over$1,000
(1) Percent of Flynn's cases in asset 29.4 38.5 14.3 17.8
range
(2) Confirmation rate (adjusted to 8.07 15.87 26.42 50.62
reflect consolidations)
(3) Percent of LoPucki/Kerkman 14.7 35.2 14.7 35.2
cases in asset range (N=88)
Expected confirmation rate for 28.5
LoPucki/Kerkman sample using (2)
and (3)
Row (3) shows that the LoPucki/Kerkman sample differs from
Flynn's national sample in its lower representation of small, low con-
firmation rate cases (assets less than $100,000), and in its higher rep-
resentation of large, high confirmation rate cases (assets greater than
$1 million). In the national sample, according to row (1), 29.4% of
the firms had assets of less than $100,000. In the LoPucki/Kerkman
sample, only 14.7% of the firms had assets of less than $100,000. In
the national sample, 17.8% had assets of more than $1 million. In the
LoPucki/Kerkman sample, 35.2% of the firms had assets of more than
$1 million. Both these differences should lead the LoPucki/Kerkman
cases to have higher confirmation rates than Flynn's national sample.
Using the number of LoPucki/Kerkman cases in each asset range,
and applying the adjusted confirmation rates in row (2), leads to an
overall expected confirmation rate of 28.5% for cases with the asset
distribution of the LoPucki/Kerkman sample of cases.
93
as a single confirmation of many filings. To illustrate: ten Chapter 11 filings by ten related
corporations cause the statistical opening of ten cases. If those cases are consolidated and
have a plan confirmed, they should be counted either as ten confirmations for ten filings
or as one confirmation for one filing, with the latter seeming to us to be the better prac-
tice. If one simply counts the number of confirmations and divides by the number of
cases, one understates the confirmation rate to be 10% rather than 100%.
91 Flynn, supra note 11, at 16-22.
92 The adjusted confirmation rates in row (2) of Table 4 were obtained by multiplying
Flynn's confirmation rates for each asset range, id. at 34 tbl.31, by the consolidation rates
for each asset range reported in id. at 15 tbl.1lA.
93 Note that this percentage does not take into account that some plans may have
prescribed liquidations rather than continued operations of the firms.
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This 28.5% expected confirmation rate does not account for pos-
sible differences in the industry distribution of Flynn's national sam-
ple and the LoPucki/Kerkman sample. For instance, the LoPucki/
Kerkman data contain few real estate cases, 94 which have low confir-
mation rates due to the likely power of a mortgage holder to block
confirmation of a plan. Many debtors file Chapter 11 real estate cases
merely to delay foreclosure proceedings.9 5 Furthermore, Flynn's
figures include farm filings, but the Finnish sample and the LoPucki/
Kerkman sample omit them. Flynn estimated that the confirmation
rate should be in the 30 to 35% range after 1986, when Chapter 12,
the family farm chapter, had been adopted.9 6 An industry-adjusted
confirmation rate, based on the national data, may well exceed 30%
for firms with the size and industry characteristics of the LoPucki/
Kerkman sample.
We thus find no evidence that U.S. confirmation rates are lower
than Finnish confirmation rates. This does not necessarily mean that
confirmation rates in either country are optimal. The U.S. system may
provide creditors with too little influence over the confirmation pro-
cess. U.S. debtors shape and communicate information about the
plan and may be expected to present the data in a light most favorable
to plan approval. Thus, the U.S. system may be confirming plans that
should be rejected.
97
In Finland, the administrator shapes the plan, disseminates infor-
mation about it, and can take a more neutral stance. As a result, per-
haps too few firms achieve plan confirmation under the Finnish Code.
Finland's more stringent initial screening may deny access to firms
that could have had plans confirmed. Only "major" creditors may
challenge the eligibility of cases. The major creditors often are banks
who, in many cases, have a part of their claims secured by collateral.
Thus, because of the standard conflict of interest between lower prior-
ity and higher priority claims, the banks may argue that a firm should
be liquidated, even where its value would be higher if reorganized. 98
But other factors suggest that the Finnish system is not too strict.
First, a Finnish court need not defer to the wishes of major creditors.
94 Compare Kerkman, supra note 67, at 165 tbl.1 (where real-estate cases represented
no more than 11% of total cases), with Fenning & Hart, supra note 11, at 143 tbl.7 (where
real-estate cases represented 40% of the total cases studied).
95 See Fenning & Hart, supra note 11, at 142.
96 Flynn, supra note 11, at 11-12.
97 SeeJensen-Conklin, supra note 11, at 321-31 (noting a high default rate for con-
firmed plans).
98 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (describing agency
problems between lower priority claimholders (shareholders in their framework) and
higher priority claimholders (creditors in their framework)).
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It is entitled to take into account all available information. 99 This
reduces the ability of major secured creditors to terminate reorganiza-
tions inappropriately. Second, the fact that many firms reorganized
under the Finnish Code file for bankruptcy within a short time after
plan confirmation indicates that the Finnish screening system is not
extremely strict. Of the 100 firms that emerged with a plan allowing
them to continue to operate, sixteen had failed to comply with the
plan in a follow-up study.100
Thus, in the LoPucki/Kerkman sample, confirmation rates are
higher than Finnish confirmation rates but the difference is neither
large nor statistically significant. Flynn's national sample yields no
solid evidence of lower U.S. confirmation rates for similarly situated
firms. Although more firms file for Chapter 11, firms achieve confir-
mation rates comparable to their Finnish counterparts.
C. Time in Reorganization Proceedings
Debtor control of Chapter 11, together with the benefits to debt-
ors from delaying the proceedings, should lead Chapter 11 proceed-.
ings to progress more slowly than Finnish proceedings. Table 3 above
shows the time elapsed in reorganization for Finnish and U.S. cases.
It is helpful to distinguish between cases in which courts confirm
plans and cases in which they do not.
1. Cases with Confirmed Plans
For debtors that emerged with confirmed reorganization
plans, 10 1 the mean time between filing and confirmation is 10.9
months for Finnish firms, which is almost the same as the U.S. mean
of 10.7 months. The median time for both countries is 10.0 months.
Regression analyses that control for firm solvency and firm size con-
firm the similarity of time periods.10 2
99 See KOSKELO, supra note 28, at 81-83, 95-108, for additional details on the initial
screening of cases.
100 See Stefan Sundgren, Does a Reorganization Law Improve the Efficiency of the In-
solvency Law? The Finnish Experience 13 (Dec. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors). The average time between the day of plan confirmation and the follow-up
study was 525 days. See id.
101 These figures include liquidated cases.
102 Indeed, the U.S. figures are biased downward because four cases were still pending
when the LoPucki and Kerkman studies were conducted. If some of the pending cases
eventually were confirmed, the mean and median times would increase. All filings in the
Finnish sample were closed when the study was conducted. We also ran regressions with
the time elapsed as a dependent variable, and (i) a country dummy variable; (ii) solvency;
and (iii) the size of the case as dependent variables both for the entire sample and only for
the limited liability companies. The coefficients of the country dummy variables were
small and insignificant, as were the other explanatory variables.
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Other studies, however, suggest that U.S. cases take about twice as
long as Finnish cases. Flynn reports mean and median confirmation
times of 24.6 and 21.1 months, respectively. 10 3 Jensen-Conklin, whose
study covers one office in the Southern District of New York, reports a
median time of 22 months. 10 4 LoPucki, reporting on cases success-
fully reorganized in the Western District of Wisconsin in 1987 and
1988, finds mean and median confirmation times of 19.4 and 17.5
months, respectively.10 5 Fenning and Hart, studying one district, find
that the median time between filing and confirmation is 13.1
months.' 0 6 Efforts to impose a "fast track" system of case processing
reduced U.S. processing times; in one district, processing time was
even below the Finnish level.
10 7
A possible explanation for the difference in time is the degree of
debtor control. Finnish administrators, assumed to act in the interest
of creditors, may propose more feasible and complete plans in the
initial phase of the proceedings. U.S. debtors can, at least in princi-
ple, delay proceedings by submitting plans not complete enough to
submit to creditors for their approval, but sufficiently complete to
avoid dismissal or conversion.' 08
The times to confirmation for the LoPucki/Kerkman sample,
and the fast-track management system in North Carolina and Los An-
geles, show that it is possible to achieve speeds close to those achieved
under the Finnish system. But results from other districts show that
103 Flynn, supra note 11, at 24.
104 Jensen-Conklin, supra note 11, at 319.
105 LoPucki, supra note 56, at 741-42.
106 Fenning & Hart, supra note 11, at 152.
107 Judge Small's fast-track procedure in the Eastern District of North Carolina re-
quires early filing of plans, provides conditional approval of disclosure statements, and
combines disclosure and confirmation hearings. See A. Thomas Small, Small Business Bank-
ruptcy Cases, 1 Am. BAN.R. INsT. L. REv. 305, 307 (1993). He reports confirmation times for
Chapter 11 plans of six to eight months. Id. at 315. Bufford's recent study reports mean
and median times for 126 cases filed in the Central District of California, located at Los
Angeles, from 1988 to 1993. Bufford, supra note 11, at 116 tblA-1. Judge Mund adopted a
fast-track procedure that handled one hundred of the cases. The key feature of fast-track
management was thatJudge Mund ordered the filing of a plan and disclosure statement at
a specified date approximately 120 days after the case was filed, and set a date for a hear-
ing. See id. at 99. This practice corresponds with the Finnish rule that the court should
specify a date when a plan should be filed, ordinarily no longer than 120 days. Fin. Reorg.
L. § 40. For the fast-track cases, the median time between filing and confirmation was 12.7
months (381 days), and for the 26 firms that filed before adoption of the faster manage-
ment, the median time was 16.7 months (502 days). See Bufford, supra note 11, at 116
tbl.A-1. Fast track management reduced the time elapsed by about 24%, but the median
Finnish time was 21% faster than cases under the Central District's fast-track procedure.
108 Apparently, debtors were given a second chance to come up with a plan in some
cases under the fast-track management system. Cases were dismissed or converted after the
initial hearing only if the disclosure statement and plan were completely insufficient. See
Bufford, supra note 11, at 99-100.
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such speeds are rarely achieved. On balance, it appears that the U.S.
system takes longer to achieve plan confirmation.
2. Cases in Which No Plan Is Confirmed
Examining cases in which no plan is confirmed demonstrates the
relative speed of the two countries' reorganization systems. Com-
pared to U.S. firms, Finnish firms stay in reorganization proceedings
for a much briefer period before they terminate. Table 3 above shows
the mean time is 3.7 months, compared to 8.6 months for U.S. firms.
The median times are 2.5 and 7.0 months, respectively. Regression
results, reported elsewhere, confirm that this finding holds after con-
trolling for the effects of industry, size, and firm solvency.10 9 The co-
efficient for the country dummy variable, equal to one for U.S. firms,
is positive and statistically significantly different from zero. Data from
other studies show a similar tendency. 10
Much of Finland's faster processing time is probably due to the
difficulty of converting or dismissing U.S. cases early in the proceed-
ings. In Finland, major creditors and others may challenge debtors'
eligibility early in the proceedings. Only 24% (61 of 257) of the Finn-
ish cases that eventually were terminated passed the initial screening
process. Differences in elapsed time for cases terminating at different
stages of the proceedings suggest how the initial screening accelerates
terminations. The median time between filing and termination was
1.4 months for the 32 cases the debtor withdrew before the screening
process had ended, 2.2 months for the 159 cases denied commence-
ment after the screening process, and 8.3 months for the 60 cases per-
mitted to commence that were later terminated.
D. Proposed Repayment Percentages
1. United States and Finland
The U.S. debtors' greater control of Chapter 11 proceedings sug-
gests that U.S. reorganization plans should be more favorable to debt-
ors than Finnish plans. LoPucki and Kerkman both find that the
debtor is in nearly complete control of the reorganization process."'
But our data differ from this prediction. With respect to pay-
ments to unsecured creditors, Table 3 shows that the mean proposed
109 Eisenberg & Sundgren, supra note 13, at 36.
110 Fenning & Hart report the median time between filing and dismissal to be 6.7
months, and between filing and conversion to be 9.4 months. Fenning & Hart, supra note
11, at 152. UnderJudge Mund's fast-track procedure, the median times between filing and
conversion, and filing and dismissal, are 5.0 months and 5.3 months, respectively. See Buf-
ford, supra note 11, at 105-08. This is more than twice the time elapsed under the Finnish
Code.
111 LoPucki, supra note 66, at 272; Kerkman, supra note 67, at 182.
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payment percentage to unsecured creditors is 42.9% of unsecured lia-
bilities for Finnish cases, and 64.0% for U.S. cases. The medians are
37% and 80%, respectively. The difference in means is statistically
significant. 12 This effect cannot be explained away on the ground
that Finnish firms propose faster repayment periods, thereby leading
to payments with more equal present values across the two countries.
Table 3 shows that Finnish firms propose substantially longer, not
shorter, payout periods than U.S. firms. Finnish firms thus propose
lower payments over a longer period of time. The present value of
the promised stream of payments is therefore much higher in the
United States. Post-confirmation performance rates do not seem to
be noticeably different.13
Regression results in Table 5 below show that U.S. creditors being
promised higher repayment amounts survives after controlling for in-
dustry, solvency, size, and length of repayment period. The coeffi-
cient for the country dummy variable, equal to one for U.S. firms, is
positive and statistically significant.
114
Table 5 below also shows that solvency is significantly and posi-
tively correlated with the proposed repayment percentage. Firm size
is significantly negatively related to repayment percentage: larger
firms promise lower percentage repayments to their creditors. A pos-
sible reason is that larger firms have more bargaining power with their
creditors."15 Moreover, problems with underpricing assets, if the firm
were to be sold in a liquidating bankruptcy, increase with firm size."1
6
Finally, Table 5 below shows that the repayment period variable is pos-
itively related to the promised repayment percentage. Thus, there is a
trade-off between promising higher repayment percentages over
longer periods and lower percentages over shorter periods. This -is
not surprising since, given a proposed repayment percentage, the pay-
ments' value decreases with the period's length.
112 T-test (p-value = .0007). Similar results emerge from other U.S. studies. See infra
Table 6.
113 Compare Sundgren, supra note 100, at 14 (projecting a 50% failure rate after six
years), with LoPucki, supra note 66, at 107 (reporting 11 surviving firms after 2.5 to 3.5
years), 122-23 (showing 21 confirmed or pending plans in the third numerical column of
Chart III).
114 The results in Table 5 do not change materially if one uses a square root, logarith-
mic, or logit transformation of the dependent variable. For the logit model, we reset 100
percent prepayment plans to 99 percent.
115 Weiss, supra note 47, at 297-98, presents empirical evidence supporting the thesis
that debtors' bargaining power increases with firm size. He finds that deviations from the
APR are more likely to occur in large Chapter 11 cases filed in the Southern District of
New York than in the normally smaller cases filed in other districts. Id. at 297-99.
116 See Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A
Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (1992).
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TABLE 5. DETERMINANTS OF PROPOSED REPAYMENT PERCENTAGES TO
UNSECURED CREDITORS. REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent Variable = Proposed Repayment Percentage
Independent Variables Coefficient Significance
U.S. filing 20.197 .010
Adjusted solvency 2.643 .016
Assets (log) -4.772 .008
Repayment period .135 .056
Industry dummy variables not reported
Constant 67.227 .000
Number of cases 110
Adjusted r-squared .154
Several factors could explain the pattern of higher proposed
repayment percentages in the United States. First, it may be that in
Finland, on average, a larger portion of claims are secured. This
would leave proportionately less assets to satisfy unsecured creditor
claims. Finnish creditors can obtain a floating charge on inventories
and other assets. On average, 35.7% of the Finnish liabilities could be
classified as secured." 7 But U.S. creditors can also obtain security
interests in debtors' inventory, receivables, and other assets. A
Department of Justice study of Chapter 11 cases filed in fiscal 1981
randomly sampled 500 cases from 18 districts. It found, on average,
secured liabilities to be 43.1% of total liabilities.118 The firms in the
sample, however, were much smaller than the firms in the LoPucki/
Kerkman data, so it is unclear whether the Department ofJustice data
suggest that the LoPucki/Kerkman firms would have similar
proportions of secured debt." 9 Other U.S. studies find both greater
and lesser percentages of secured debt in wider loan portfolios.'
20
117 See Sundgren, supra note 100, at 12 tbl.4.
118 See Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Liquidation and Reorganization, in HANDBOOK OF
MODERN FINANCE 35-1, 35-30 tbl.35.3, col.6 (Dennis E. Logue ed., 1984). White reports a
similar percentage for 45 firms that filed to reorganize in the Southern District of New
York in 1980-81. Id. col.4.
119 See id. col.6 (showing mean assets of $257,000 compared to over $2 million for the
LoPucki/Kerkman sample). Even adjusting the Department of Justice data for inflation
would not suggest that the firms in the samples were of comparable size. Liabilities
entitled to priority do not appear to be large enough to substantially influence the analysis.
See id. (showing priority liabilities comprising less than 5% of total liabilities).
120 See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk, 25J.
MONETARY ECON. 21, 31 (1990) (in sample of bank loans from 1977 to 1988, 27% of dollar
volume of loans were secured); James R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-
Monitoring Hypothesis, 31J. Fin. ECON. 25, 31-32 (1992);John D. Leeth &Jonathan A. Scott,
The Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence from the Small Business Community, 24 J. FiN. &
QUANTATVE ANALvsis 379, 379 (1989) (reporting studies finding that almost 80% of
dollar volume of large- and small-business loans were secured).
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Second, differences in the classes of preferred unsecured
creditors could also affect the proposed payoff rate to general
unsecured creditors. However, Finnish priority rules for unsecured
claims do not self-evidently lead to a smaller pool for unsecured
creditors than U.S. rules. As part of the legislation that reduced the
priority of the floating charge, Finnish law eliminated the priority of
pension payments, taxes, and wages. Finnish law treats unpaid wages,
pension payments, and taxes as general unsecured claims.121 (But
note that wages enjoyed a high priority during a period of transition
that includes the period studied here.) In the United States, these
and other unsecured claims enjoy some priority over general
unsecured claims. 122 Administrative expenses include attorney fees
and enjoy priority over unsecured claims. They are, therefore, not
likely to be substantially lower in the United States than in other
countries. 123 Thus, treatment of preferred unsecured creditors does
not unambiguously point towards higher U.S. payments to general
unsecured creditors.
Third, U.S. unsecured creditors could be paid more at the
expense of the payoff to secured creditors. Results for public firms
show that Chapter 11 plans overpay debtors at the expense of secured
creditors, but that this overpayment rate is small.'
24
Fourth, different cultural norms might exert pressure on U.S.
debtors to repay a higher fraction of their unsecured debts. Our
instinct, however, is that the United States is not especially known for
aversion to debt avoidance and that Finland is not especially known
for a fondness for debt avoidance. We suspect that other, more
tangible, factors are at work.
Fifth, different macroecomonic conditions might have prevailed
at the times of the studies. If Finnish economic prospects were
weaker, debtors may have proposed, and creditors may have accepted,
lower proposed plan payments. But economic prospects in the
United States were not particularly bright at the time of the LoPucki/
121 The priority rules are contained in "L om ordning i vilken borgendrer skall fa
betalning" [Priority Law] 30.12.1992/1578. Although wages are not priority claims, the
government guarantees unpaid prefiling wages. The European Community requires that
member states take measures necessary to insure that institutions guarantee payment of
employees' outstanding wages and employment claims arising before insolvency. Council
Directive 80/987 of 20 Oct. 1980 Protection of Employees in the Event of the Insolvency of
Their Employer, 1980 OJ. (L 283) 23.
122 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3),(8) (1994).
123 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 4, at 146 n.82 (reporting low
administrative costs forJapanese compositions).
124 SeeJulian R. Franks & Waiter N. Torous, A Comparison of Financial Recontracting in
Distressed Exchanges and Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 35 J. FiN. ECON. 349, 363 (1994)
(reporting negative deviations of -1.67% for secured creditors in a study of 37
reorganizations); id. at tbl.6; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 47, at 142 tbl.III.
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Kerkman cases. Bankruptcy filings were fairly high. 125 In addition,
the Finnish data cover a period that followed a severe recession, but
the firms studied did not file for reorganization in the midst of the
recession. 12
6
The simplest explanation for the different proposed repayment
percentages is varying cramdown standards. Chapter l1's standard
for confirming a plan over the objection of an unsecured creditor
class requires either that all senior classes be paid in full or that no
junior interest receive any value under the reorganization plan.
12 7
Because ownership interests are junior to creditor interests, the firm's
owners, in general, cannot retain any interest in the reorganized firm
unless they propose a plan that will pay all creditors in full. Finnish
owners are not constrained by an APR. To confirm a plan over an
objecting creditor class, they merely need approval of one-fifth of all
creditors.
The data suggest the importance of the APR. Looking deeper
into the difference between the U.S. and Finnish mean and median
proposed repayment percentages is revealing. The difference in
proposed, unsecured liability repayment percentages stems from the
dominance of U.S. plans in which debtors propose to repay 100% of
unsecured liabilities. In the LoPucki/Kerkman sample, complete
repayment plans constituted 45.5% (15 of 33) of the plans for which
repayment terms are known. In Finnish cases, only 10.6% (9 of 85) of
the plans proposed 100% repayment.128 Many U.S. firms probably
opt for 100% repayment plans because the owners shaping those
plans want to retain ownership of the reorganized firms. Plan
completion rates do not appear to differ substantially.129
Thus, the results undermine the belief that U.S. creditors' weaker
negotiating position leads to their receiving repayments that are too
small under debtor-dominated plans. A U.S. legal rule-absolute
priority-protects creditors to the point of rendering them better off
than Finnish creditors. Perhaps Finnish creditors should be more
concerned about the absence of an APR than U.S. creditors should be
about Chapter l1's prodebtor features. Under Chapter 11, U.S.
creditors receive more of a firm's going concern surplus than Finnish
creditors do under their country's system.' 30
125 See White, supra note 118, at 35-26 tbl.35.1.
126 See supra note 85 for data on maroeconomic conditions in the countries at the
times of the reorganization filings.
127 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), (b)(2)(C)(ii) (1994).
128 The difference in the rate of 100% repayment plans is highly statistically significant
(p < 0.0001).
129 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
130 The going concern surplus depends on the percentage of debt to be repaid and on




The higher U.S. proposed repayment rates are sufficiently star-
tling to merit further exploration. In addition to the United States
and Finland, we consider data on reorganization payments to un-
secured creditors in Australia, Canada, and Japan. These countries'
reorganization laws resemble Chapter 11, though important differ-
ences exist. Discussions of these countries' reorganization laws are
available elsewhere l3 so we summarize briefly only central features
here.
Although their reorganization laws resemble Chapter 11, these
countries all grant the debtor less control of the reorganization pro-
cess than Chapter 11 grants. In all three countries, a neutral or credi-
tor-oriented official plays a greater role than in the United States.
The United States is the only country in which, in a typical case, the
debtor commences the case, the debtor's management retains control
of the firm during the reorganization, the norm is limited, serious
early screening of the likelihood of a successful reorganization, the
debtor proposes the reorganization plan, and the debtor prepares
and disseminates information about the reorganization plan.
These Chapter 11 features support the common belief that U.S.
reorganization laws are more lenient towards debtors than other
countries' reorganization laws. Given this pro-debtor orientation, one
might expect, as a first approximation, other countries' laws to lead to
more favorable treatment of unsecured creditors than Chapter 11.
To assess this prediction, Table 6 below summarizes twelve empir-
ical studies 3 2 of the five countries' reorganization laws. It presents
subject firms' assets, the monetary units in which those assets are ex-
pressed, the unsecured creditors' proposed repayment percentages,
and each study's rank based on the proposed repayment percentage.
rate and estimates of firm liquidation value (available only for Finnish firms), the average
surplus for the Finnish firms in the sample is 13%. See Sundgren, supra note 100, at 2. See
id. at 14 for the justification for the particular discount rate used.
13' See CORPORATE INSOLvENCz LAw (J.P.G. Lessing &J.F. Corkery eds., 1995) (Austra-
lian law); Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 4; Lynn M. LoPucki & George M. Triantis, A
Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization ofFinancially Distressed Compa-
nies, '35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 267 (1994).
132 The studies are, in the order listed in the Table: Simon Coad, The Australian Society
of CPAs Survey of the First Year of Voluntary Administrations, in CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW,
supra note 131, at 49; FISHER & MARTEL, supra note 62; Timothy C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn
Martel, Will the Bankruptcy Reforms Work? An Empirical Analysis of Financial Reorganization in
Canada, 20 CAN. PUB. POL'Y-ANALYSE DE POLrrIQUEs, 265, 267 (1994); L. Kryzanowsky &J.
Holland, Bankruptcies and Commercial Arrangements in Canada, INSOLVENCY BULL, Sept. 1984,
at 3; this study (for Finland and the United States); Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 4, at
139; Eberhart et al., supra note 47, at 1461-63; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 47, at 142;
Flynn, supra note 11, at 17, 31; Weiss, supra note 47, at 295, app. at 300-12 tbl.4; and White,
supra note 118, at 35-30 to -35.
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TABLE 6. REORGANIZATIONS IN FivE CouNTRiEs: PROPOSED
UNSECURED REPAYMENT PERCENTAGES
Country Study; (N) in parentheses
Australia Coad (1995) (423)
Canada Fisher & Martel (1996) (393)
Canada Fisher & Martel (1994) (338)
Canada Kryzanowsky & Holland (1984)
(41)
Finland this study (85)
Japan Eisenberg & Tagashira (1994)
(352)
U.S. Eberhart, Moore, & Roenfeldt
(1990) (30)
U.S. this study (33)
U.S. LoPucki & Whitford (1990)
(41)
U.S. Flynn (1989) (2,395)
U.S. Weiss (1990) (37)




2,453 (000 1993 $C)
2,372 (000 1993 $C)
248 (000 nominal $C)
2,100 (000 1992 $)
499 (mill. 1987 Y)
public
2,257 (000 1992 $)
public
4,800 (000 nominal $)
public
1,643 (000 1984 $)
* This figure is the middle of the median repayment percents of 15 districts studied. The
15 medians ranged from 45.2% to 75.9%.
The data confirm the results of the U.S.-Finnish comparison. Ta-
ble 6's nearly uniform pattern is that proposed repayments to un-
secured creditors are higher in the United States than in any other
country. As measured by mean unsecured creditor proposed repay-
ment percentages, the five top-ranking studies are all of United States
firms in Chapter 11.
Other factors could explain the observed pattern while preserv-
ing the pro-debtor view of Chapter 11. Some of the high U.S. pro-
posed repayment percentages could be attributed to samples
consisting of large public firms, which may be healthier than typical
Chapter 11 firms. This could explain the Eberhart et al., LoPucki and
Whitford, and Weiss studies. However, the higher proposed repay-
ment percentages also emerge in studies of smaller firms, such as
those studied here and in Flynn's study. Only White's 1984 study of
64 firms in one federal district departs from this pattern, and even this
study contains only modest evidence that Chapter 11 unsecured credi-
tors fare noticeably worse than unsecured creditors in other countries.
Other possible explanations, such as those explored above, could
exist for each of these countries. But the multicountry comparison is
consistent with our more detailed U.S.-Finnish comparison. Perhaps































3. Implications of Findings for Priority Proposals
Despite the Finnish rule limiting secured creditor priority, the
United States has higher proposed payments to unsecured creditors.
The principle underlying the 1993 introduction of partial secured pri-
ority into Finnish law was to promote equal treatment of creditors.'33
Lawmakers also believed that more equal treatment of creditors would
reduce obstacles to reorganization. 34 Large differences between the
competing interests of groups of creditors could cause conflicts be-
tween high and low priority claimholders. Because Finnish reorgani-
zation law does not predate 1993, one cannot compare payment rates
to unsecured creditors before and after the introduction of partial se-
cured creditor priority.
We can merely observe that Finland's partial secured creditor pri-
ority does not lead to greater proposed payouts to unsecured creditors
in reorganizations than in the United States. It is also clear that sev-
eral other factors, some of which we address in our empirical analysis,
can influence unsecured payment rates. If we are correct, the high
U.S. unsecured payment rate is a consequence of the APR. There is
no theoretical reason why reduced secured creditor priority should
not further enhance the unsecured creditors' position. Nevertheless,
our data suggest, admittedly tentatively, that one should not expect
dramatically increased reorganization payments to unsecured credi-
tors to result from adjusting secured creditor priority. The pro-credi-
tor Finnish system, with its reduced secured creditor priority, does not
produce unsecured repayment percentages near the U.S. level. How
much room is there for increase in the United States?
CONCLUSION
Given an insolvency filing, U.S. firms are more likely to choose
reorganization over liquidation. Although firms file for reorganiza-
tion at a higher rate in the United States, we find no significant differ-
ences in plan confirmation rates. U.S. filings are more likely to lead
to plan confirmation, although not significantly so.
Finland's stricter initial screening leads to faster case processing.
The time between filing and termination of unsuccessful reorganiza-
tions is almost three times longer for U.S. firms. The pro-debtor U.S.
system also has longer successful proceedings. Compared with some
studies, the time elapsed is more than twice as long as in Finland. But
some districts achieve speeds close to those in Finland. On balance,
the Finnish experience suggests that early, serious filtering of reorgan-
'33 See Draft bill 1992rd-RP 181, at 19 (proposal for revised priority rules).
134 See id. at 17.
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ization candidates could reduce the time dedicated to firms with weak
reorganization prospects.
One expects the more pro-debtor Chapter 11 to yield plans
promising less to creditors and leaving the owners with a larger share
of the reorganization surplus. Yet, the data do not support this pre-
diction. Unsecured creditors receive significantly more under the
U.S. Code. The most likely explanation is Chapter l's requirement
of payment in full to senior classes before junior classes receive
consideration.
Unsecured creditors' beneficial treatment bears on the impact of
reduced secured creditor priority. Will reduced priority lead to ob-
servable differences in payments? Our results suggest that secured
creditor priority is part of a complex system in which the effect of a
change in priority will filter through ex ante lending practices, the
decision to file for bankruptcy or reorganization, the financial status
of the firms, preferred creditor priorities, and confirmation stan-
dards.135 The marginal effect of reduced secured creditor priority on
U.S. unsecured Chapter 11 creditors, who already fare relatively well,
may be modest. Different results may obtain under Chapter 7.
135 Our data may contain the first evidence, albeit indirect, that Chapter 11 provides
creditors with more than they would receive in liquidation. For the Finnish firms we study,
reorganization law has provided a gain to creditors over what they would have received in
liquidation. See Sundgren, supra note 100, at 18-19. We show that Chapter 11 results in at
least as high payments to creditors as does Finnish law. Therefore, unless U.S. and Finnish
liquidation values differ substantially, for firms comparable to those in the LoPucki/
Kerkman sample, Chapter 11 also results in creditors receiving more than they would in
liquidation.
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